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Chapter 6
Extending agency
The merit of relational approaches for 
Childhood Studies
Eberhard Raithelhuber
Current discussions on the concept of agency in the inter- and multidisciplinary 
field of Childhood Studies are a reaction to the deficits revealed in the way the New 
Sociology of Childhood has viewed agency: as an attempt to gain a more nuanced, 
differentiated understanding of agency on both an empirical and a theoretical level. 
My intention here is to contribute to the current reconceptualisation of agency, but 
not in the sense of providing a better or more nuanced understanding of individual 
or human agency. Quite the contrary, I argue for a different understanding of 
agency as social and collective, which allows for different sensitivities and methodolo-
gies in research on childhood. I will bring into play selected contributions on agency 
in the social theory and social anthropology of the last two decades that share a rela-
tional/relativistic approach towards the social. The core argument that I want to 
push forward is that a relational conception of agency can be one productive reaction 
towards the claim by Prout and others that we need to reflect on existing understand-
ings of agency in the field, all the time striving for a qualitatively different approach 
toward agency. This perspective turns away from predominantly intentional and 
cognitive understandings of agency. Hence, agents are not substantialised agents, 
but often consist of overlapping entities or fabrics, which are complex and in motion. 
Consequently, agency can be seen as a realised, situated and permuted capacity, 
which can be accomplished through the combination of various interconnected “per-
sons” and “things”.
The presentation of children as “agentic social beings” and the idea of “children’s 
agency” were core notions within the emerging field of the (new) Sociology 
of Childhood in the 1980s and 1990s. They still resonate powerfully in much 
of today’s work. indeed, this strong idea, in its dual aspect both as a normative 
assertion and as a call for an empirical and conceptual reorientation in the study of 
childhood (Alanen, 2010, p. 5) has inspired manifold queries. On the one hand, 
the powerful seed of “children’s agency”, most present in the so-called new 
Childhood Paradigm, has been nurtured by countless empirical contributions. 
One way or the other, many of these publications employ the term “agency” 
to exemplify the social construction of childhood and, in doing so, to testify to 
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children’s contribution to it as active social agents. On the other hand,  scholars 
have also been critical in their reviews of the idea and concept of agency in 
Childhood Studies, in particular within the last decade. This reflects the growth 
of empirical research as well as the vast expansion of Childhood Studies into an 
interdisciplinary space with differentiated, multiple approaches.
It is probably fair to say that the Sociology of Childhood is now at a stage 
at which the established, mainstream understandings of agency are scrambled. 
Not only has children’s agency become a “troubled idea” (Oswell, 2013, p. 7), 
but agency has also been accused of being one of the mantras in Childhood 
Studies (Tisdall & Punch, 2012, p. 255). Now, the idea has started to be 
investigated more profoundly. My intention here is to contribute to the cur-
rent  re-conceptualisation of agency, but not in the sense of providing a better or 
more nuanced understanding of individual or human agency. Quite the contrary: 
I argue for a different understanding of agency as social and collective, which 
allows for different sensitivities and methodologies in research on childhood, 
something that I will nevertheless only be able to hint at in this contribution. 
To open up conventional thinking, I employ a strategy of extending agency. I 
will bring into play selected contributions on agency in the social theory and 
social anthropology of the last two decades that share a relational/relativistic 
approach towards the social. I will very briefly recall some aspects of how agency 
was seen in the 1980s and 1990s in Childhood Studies, most prominently repre-
sented in the New Childhood Paradigm, when this development was very much 
influenced by the debate on a dualistic understanding and mediation of “(social) 
structure/agency” (see also Oswell, 2013, pp. 37–50). Then I will sketch out 
some conceptual contributions and recent reactions towards identified deficits in 
Childhood Studies. The intention of this is not to provide an overall review of 
the  existing  literature. Rather, the objective is to exemplify some critical aspects 
that, on the one hand, still remain unresolved and, on the other hand, are  starting 
points for an extension of existing notions of agency in Childhood Studies. To 
move towards this extension I will then step back in history, recalling that the 
 introduction of the concept of agency in Childhood Studies in the 1980s was 
closely linked to wider developments in the field of social theory. Within these 
discussions on agency, a number of recent contributions, which can be grouped 
under the label  “relativistic/relational approaches”, offer interesting perspectives 
for the future orientation of research.
The conventional understanding of agency in 
Childhood Studies and recent reactions
There is no doubt that within the last two to three decades, agency has become a 
prominent concept in countless fields of social science, amongst them Childhood 
Studies. This development in the social studies of childhood is most visible in the 
so-called “new childhood paradigm” (James & Prout, 1990). It is well known 
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that this perspective claims to give voice to children and, likewise, acknowledges 
children’s agency. Hence, children are denoted as “social actors” and “children’s 
agency” becomes a core idea (Prout, 2008, p. 29). inseparably from this claim, 
the new paradigm, which still resonates in many current contributions, draws 
attention to the fact that structural and socio-cultural conditions of childhood in 
modern society block, handicap or distort this fundamental capacity (Qvortrup, 
Corsaro, & Honig, 2009, p. 4). in short, what i call the conventional under-
standing of agency, deeply rooted in modernist sociology (Prout, 2011, p. 6), has 
a twofold nature. First, it states that children “have” or “possess” agency (e.g. in 
james, 2009, p. 42ff.; see also Mayall, 2002, pp. 33f.; Corsaro, 2005), thus being 
able to bring about change or to make a difference. Second, studies following this 
line of thought want to prove this “new” perspective and empirically investigate 
how individual children can express agency in the context of constraining and 
enabling conditions. This conventional understanding of agency joins the line 
of dualisms that characterise Western, Euro-centric perceptions of the world and 
about the world. it rests on fundamental divisions and oppositions, such as mind 
and body, individual and society, micro and macro, human and non-human, and 
so on. Thus, many contributions in the new Sociology of Childhood and, in 
particular, protagonists of the new Childhood Paradigm tend to display indi-
vidualistic or even naturalistic conceptualisations of agency. They share a human-
ist account of agency that can be called a “capacity concept of agency” (Passoth, 
Peuker, & Schillmeier, 2012, p. 1) and that is widespread in sociological theory.
in recent years, a number of contributions have identified some weak points 
of this depiction, for example, going against a simple definition of agency as 
“the capacity of individuals to act independently” (james & james, 2012, p. 3). 
Some have tried to go beyond a mere critique, offering propositions for vary-
ing degrees of modification. For example, Bühler-niederberger and Schwittek 
(2014) claimed that a conventional understanding of agency only considers 
agency in cases where children challenge or alter existing structures, i.e. where 
they make a difference to the existing order of the social. They presented the 
results of a study that takes children’s agency into account as something that can 
also serve to solidify existing structures. Thus, partly leaning on Anselm Strauss, 
they start out from the assumption that ordering the social has to be understood 
as an on-going process to which every participant contributes through his or her 
active involvement (Bühler-niederberger & Schwittek, 2014, p. 505). Hence, 
this implies that things and orders are not only altered by human activity, but 
also have to be kept stable or durable through that activity. At first sight, one 
might easily agree with their claim. nevertheless, the criticism i would like to 
make is that this contribution does not provide any deeper understanding of 
agency, i.e. with regard to its production or form of existence that goes beyond 
conventional understanding. Their understanding of agency remains somehow 
individualistic, humanist and cognitive, though taking note of current contribu-
tions inspired by relational social theory (e.g. Oswell, 2013). To take another 
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recent contribution, larkins has presented an interesting paper arguing for 
“a fuller framework for  understanding children’s social and political agency in 
citizenship” (larkins, 2014, p. 10). Partly leaning on isin’s ideas about Acts of 
citizenship (isin, 2008), she claims that the Act comes first and that the actor 
is a consequence of this mobilisation. Although isin is not primarily concerned 
with the concept of agency, his enactment approach does not start out from the 
idea that agency is something existing or residing within an actor-body or a pre-
established agent (isin, 2009, p. 383; Raithelhuber, 2015). in my reading of isin, 
agency (political or otherwise) and agenthood both are a secondary product of 
enactment and an attribution within a complex milieu that is disturbed. Thus, 
they are not something that is “exercised” by children or is essentially “theirs”, 
as larkins suggests (2014, pp. 9, 13). larkins does not deliver any information 
about the quality or constitution of this assumed agency, e.g. by asking how it 
can be that an agency of this kind is brought about and becomes manifest in that 
very situation. To turn to a third example, konstantoni (2012) has presented a 
study based on Prout’s critique of a much-too-strong notion of the autonomous, 
independent child and its agency (Prout, 2005). nevertheless, her idea about 
interdependency seems to take the actor (or the individual) as a primary existing 
entity and a given. Only from that starting point does she examine connections, 
relations and their dynamics. Within this picture, the understanding of agency 
remains ensnared in the binarity or dualism of structure/agency, whereas struc-
ture is conceived as enabling and constraining factors. Hence, konstantoni does 
not consider that agency itself might be a product of negotiation by different 
actors (including humans and things).
These three references are only some examples of a trait in the much broader 
discussion. in contrast, other recent contributions to agency in Childhood Studies 
already display a relational/relativistic understanding of agency. This is most vis-
ible in current empirical and conceptual contributions on embodiment and arte-
facts in Childhood Studies. They show that agency is slightly losing its exclusively 
“human” character. To take an example, Prout (2008, p. 33) refers to the work 
of Ogilvie-Whyte (2003), arguing that children’s agency partly has to be under-
stood as an effect of their interrelationship with artefacts. it is noteworthy that 
Ogilvie-Whyte (2003) employs aspects of a symmetrical sociology, which latour 
has outlined (latour, 2005). Hence, we can say that the understanding of agency 
in Prout’s work already somehow conceptually extends beyond the conventional 
understanding. in this respect, the work by Woodyer (2008) on embodied prac-
tice and children’s geographies is very promising. On the one hand, she discusses 
the significance of anti-dualist, anti-representational approaches for research on 
childhood. On the other hand, she takes up the relational/materialist concept of 
heterogeneous, hybrid geographies proposed by Whatmore (2002). This implies 
a de-centred understanding of agency as social agency and as a precarious achieve-
ment. Hence, Woodyer argues that the social and the material interact and gear 
into each other in messy ways. This allows her to start out from the connections 
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between different, heterogeneous elements of relational configurations, i.e. the 
socio-material assemblages (Woodyer, 2008, p. 358f.). Once again, the connec-
tion to AnT stands out; here, it is enriched by references to non-representational 
theory (Thrift, 1996, p. 24). References to the work of Gell (1998) are also strik-
ing (see below).
To sum up, current discussions on the concept of agency in the inter- and 
multidisciplinary field of Childhood Studies are a reaction to the deficits revealed 
in the view of agency in “early” new Childhood Studies, trying to gain a more 
nuanced, differentiated understanding of agency on both an empirical and a 
theoretical level. While some take up new ideas on agency from the on-going 
discussions in social theory, for example those leaning on a relational/relativistic 
approach towards the social, most contributors stick to the conventional notion 
of agency that is anchored in a dualist conception of structure/agency or any 
mediation of this binarity. Hence, generally speaking, a large part of the literature 
in this field still has a poor and unsatisfactory understanding of agency, though 
there are promising signs, and possible points for extension can be spotted. To 
be able to take up new ideas on agency and reorient research, i propose tak-
ing a close look at how the conventional understanding of agency in Childhood 
Studies connects to wider shifts in the sciences, especially in social science.
Agency in social theory, or the structure/agency dilemma
The agency assumptions of the new Sociology of Childhood since the 1980s 
link conceptually to two isochronic key developments in social theory. First, they 
are connected to a renewed emergence and strengthening of an agency perspec-
tive, thus contesting previous and predominant structural/functional and struc-
tural/deterministic concepts of action (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004, pp. 91, 113f.). 
Second, as a result, this agency perspective in social science has had to dissociate 
its understanding of agency from older notions of “free will” and “free actors”, 
as well as from ideas about autonomous, independent, unconditioned individuals 
or subjects. As king (2007) has already elaborated extensively, protagonists of the 
new Sociology of Childhood, in particular, painted a humanist, individualist and 
quasi-natural picture of children’s agency, while at the same time, as sociological 
scholars, they paid homage to the communicative codes of the sociological zeit-
geist. Thus, they connected their picture of children’s agency to suitable synthe-
tising approaches, working on what was known as structure-agency integration 
(Bryant & jary, 1997, p. 3). This development in new Childhood Studies runs 
parallel to trends in related fields. For example, in the last two decades Anglo-
American lifecourse Research and Aging Studies have shown similar characteris-
tics (see Raithelhuber, 2011).
The concept of agency has been a hotly debated key issue in discussion on the 
social within the last three decades (Carle, 2005). Roughly outlined, agency in 
philosophy, religious studies, social sciences and human sciences implies the idea 
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that someone or something is endowed with a capacity or potential to do things 
and to make a difference. This means that he, she or it can causally impact on 
himself, herself or itself or on the environment in a transformative or creative 
manner or, alternatively, can resist such an influence from outside. Often, agency 
is linked to intentionality, thus representing intention or some sort of conscious-
ness, or at least a form of practical reflexivity (Ahearn, 2010, p. 34). in many 
cases, agency contrasts with the concept structure. in this context, structure rep-
resents something solid and durable to explain the continuity, perpetuation, repli-
cation and distribution of relatively constant or similar human actions in time and 
space (Sztompka, 1994), while agency stands for the dynamic, creative moments 
of action. This notion is based on the idea of a continuum with two ends or 
poles. Thus, “free will” or “choice” is at one end, wherein agency represents 
the potential to bring about an uncaused cause. This notion of agency contrasts 
with “causation” at the other end, i.e. the notion that something or someone is 
caused, e.g. from outside or inside.
Since the 1970s, several theoretical approaches have been presented that 
have tried to describe, shed light on or criticise the interconnectedness of these 
 antagonistic concepts. in this context, Giddens’ Theory of Structuration (1984), 
in which agency is a core concept, has become the most prominent. This model-
ling of agency is reflected in many contributions in the new Childhood Studies 
(e.g. james & Prout, 1997, p. 5; james, jenks, & Prout, 1998, p. 202; Mayall, 
1996, p. 53), as well as offering references (e.g. Mayall, 2002, p. 33ff.) to the 
Realisms of Roy Bashkar and Margaret Archer (see also king, 2007). it is a 
 well-known fact that Giddens attempts to overcome dual conceptions of the 
social with his key concept of a duality of structure. Hence, he defines structure 
as a pre- condition for action, but simultaneously claims that action reproduces 
structure and even has the capacity to change or modify structure. This is due to 
agency, as the following core quotes show:
Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their 
capability of doing those things in the first place (which is why agency 
implies power […]). […] Agency concerns events of which an individual 
is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in 
a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. (Giddens, 1984, p. 9, 
author’s emphasis)
Action depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a differ-
ence’ to a pre – existing state of affairs or course of events. (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 14; author’s emphasis)
The citations highlight a general trait of the conventional thinking on agency. 
According to Giddens, agency is a capacity or potential of an individual, that is 
a human being, to be the causal originator of action. Ultimately, this kind of 
individual agency rests upon a cognitive operation, independently of how much 
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a person is conscious of this process or able to speak about it. Metaphorically 
 speaking, agency is located relatively permanently in one body and thus lies hid-
den in one head until it originates action. Thus, agency is a relatively stable, essen-
tial feature or primordial quality of any individual human being, which extends 
and varies across the life course. Hence, it is “human agency”.
Many works in social science, particularly in sociology, denounce this under-
standing of agency as substantialist, essentialist, humanist and individualistic 
(Raithelhuber, 2011, pp. 112–185). in addition, such critiques are also voiced 
beyond our closer intellectual environment, for example in such rising disciplines 
as neurology (Gazzaniga, 2011) as well as in “older” branches of science such as 
philosophy, in particular in moral philosophy (Honoré, 2010). A number of such 
contributions have roots in science and technology studies or are linked to the 
material turn in social and human sciences. Contributions in social and cultural 
sciences that intend to conceptualise agency beyond the conventional notion fol-
low a methodological and empirical route to address the ways in which agency 
is produced socially and situated, i.e. in the context of everyday action, as well 
as the manner in which it becomes socially operative and effective. To demarcate 
the fundamental disparity between the ways in which agency is approached, one 
can distinguish between two positions. On one hand, there is the conventional 
notion of agency as “individual agency” or “human agency”. On the other hand, 
we talk about “social agency” or even “collective agency” (e.g. Barnes, 2001, 
p. 349).
Relational/relativistic approaches towards agency
To extend our conventional notion of agency, i propose to engage deeply with 
relational approaches. The core argument that i want to push forward here is 
that a relational conception of agency can be one productive reaction towards 
the claim by Prout and others that we need to reflect on existing understandings 
of agency in the field, all the time striving for a qualitatively different approach 
toward agency (see Prout, 2000, p. 16; 2005, p. 65; Bühler-niederberger & van 
krieken, 2008). A relational conception of agency reacts to the theoretically and 
empirically unsatisfactory determination of agency that still characterises the dis-
cussion about “childhood agency” or “children’s agency” in Childhood Studies 
(Oswell, 2013, p. 50).
Contributions that allow a sought-after more complex perspective on agency 
make use of different theoretical movements. For the purpose of this chapter, i lean 
on contributions that can be grouped under the label “relational/relativistic” and 
make use, in particular, of contributions in cultural sciences (see also Bollig & 
kelle, Oswell and Esser in this volume). Findings in anthropological research on 
agency and rituals make it clear that agency does not always have to be embodied, 
at least not in the sense of being restricted to solely one human body. it can be 
distributed among various participants in action. To formulate this more radically, 
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one can say that agency can only exist in interconnectedness and be brought 
about in relations. According to Sax, agency should be conceived of most gener-
ally as “the ability to transform the world” (Sax, 2006, p. 474). This allows us to 
ask what the nature of this transformative capacity is, what it consists of and how 
it is made up (2013, p. 27). it seems reasonable to ask such questions in research 
on rituals, especially, because rituals often bring about transformations, e.g. in 
the context of therapies or conflict solutions (2006, p. 476). Manifestations of 
agency, i.e. the public instantiation and revelation of an agentic potential, play an 
important role in rituals. in addition, research on agency in ritual contexts also 
shows the significance of connectivity and collective accomplishments. Further, 
these accomplishments show that non-human beings, unanimated things or spir-
itual instances can “have” agency or be endowed with agency. To give but one 
example, the “agency” that a priest “possesses” when bringing together a couple 
is not his or her agentic potential as an individual person. Moreover, this agentic 
potential is distributed among various people, institutions and practices (p. 477), 
such as the church, the couple, the wedding contract (i.e. the sheet of paper used 
for it), and so on. Some of these aspects connect far back in time, for example to 
the authorisation that the priest received through his ordination. Only this inter-
connectedness of various aspects in time and space can explain the agency that 
becomes manifest in rituals:
Ritual is the point at which the agency distributed among other persons, 
relationships, and social institutions is articulated and made manifest. (Sax, 
2006, p. 478)
This is the reason why Sax concludes that ritual agency should be conceived as 
being distributed in networks, at best. Agency is not necessarily restricted to one 
single person. indeed, this kind of limitation is actually a rare case (2013, p. 28).
Contributions such as Sax’s connect with an increasing number of studies that 
employ a relational/relativistic perspective, most obviously when envisioning 
the connections between things and between human beings and things. They 
open up perspectives to reconceptualise and newly understand agency beyond 
the individualistic bias. Thus, this allows agency to be considered in the context 
of a fundamental sociality that embraces non-human things, both animated and 
unanimated (e.g. latour, 2005). Perspectives of this kind can also be found in a 
number of theoretical contributions on the role of materiality in social practices 
(Schatzki, 2010). Others who are essentially in line with a relational approach 
of this kind observe how things can become mediators of agency or mediating 
instances. According to Gell (1998), things can become elements of a causal/
relational milieu or structuring of the social in which agency is produced as well 
as allocated and attached to various “things”. This allows us to envision the eve-
ryday practices and discourses in which humans attribute agency to other humans 
as well as to objects.
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“[S]ocial agency” is not defined in terms of “basic” biological attributes 
(such as inanimate thing vs. incarnate person) but is relational – it does not 
matter, in ascribing “social agent” status, what a thing (or a person) “is” 
in itself; what matters is where it stands in a network of social relations. 
(Gell, 1998, p. 123; author’s emphasis)
This form of perspectivation allows for agency to be envisioned and investi-
gated as an essential aspect of an overall milieu, as opposed to an understand-
ing of agency as purely an element of the human psyche (Gell, 1998, p. 20). 
Realistically, this approach also allows artefacts and naturefacts, i.e. “things”, to 
be perceived as elements of a specific social identity and social agency. Hence, 
agents are those human beings and things that have a specific status within a 
network of social relations, i.e. social positions that can originate causal events 
in their environment. in other words, if human beings or things inherit a status 
of this kind, they become instances of agency. Further, Gell shows that agents 
are not always located solely in one place and that their existence is not reduced 
to solely one particular temporal segment. Thus, sometimes agents seem to have 
various bodies, which can appear at different places in different moments, some 
of them even outlasting the life of one individual (p. 21; see also Raithelhuber, 
2011, pp. 162–68).
To take a third and final example, sharing this anti-individualistic under-
standing of agency, Holland, lachicotte, Skinner and Cain (1998) study how 
human beings mediate and transform meaning. Hence, human beings bring 
about agency to gain control over their own behaviour, i.e. their own activities 
and mental processes. The authors conceive of agency as socially produced and 
culturally constructed activities, which are present in concrete social practices 
that they call “figured worlds” (p. 38). Borrowing from vygotsky, Holland and 
her colleagues take on the idea of “mediating devices”, i.e. gadgets or appara-
tuses that have a mediating, moderating and connecting quality. Human beings 
use these devices to control their mental processes. For example, we use a knot 
tied in a handkerchief to remind us that we intend to do or undo something 
in the future. Such devices are “external” objects that are both generalised and 
culturally produced. individuals use them to entrench or embed themselves in 
their respective environment as well as to “bring about” change. it is essential 
for this approach that the assignation of meaning as well as the placement of 
these “things” must not be considered as an individual action, even if done fully 
“ consciously”. Moreover, such devices are part of collectively produced systems 
of meaning (Holland et al., 1998, p. 35). The contribution by Holland and col-
leagues leans heavily on the anti-essentialist work of the post-colonial indologist 
Ronald inden (1990; Holland et al., 1998, p. 42). As inden states, agents and 
agencies can be conceived as being complex, changeable and in motion. They 
produce and reproduce each other in a dialectical process in constantly shifting 
situations (inden, 1990, p. 2).
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Consequences of a relational-relativistic 
understanding of agency
The three examples presented display a unique engagement with agency, but share 
a relational/relativistic perspective. instead of asking for the quality and condi-
tioning of “individual agency” (in the sense of capacities, features, competences, 
etc.), they propose investigating the socio-generative mechanisms that bring 
about something like “agency”. Hence, if we consider “agency as an open empiri-
cal question and not as an answer given by theoretical decisions” (Passoth, Peuker, 
& Schillmeier, 2012, p. 5), then our attention turns towards movements and rela-
tions, i.e. towards processes, actions, situations, in which things become ligated 
and disconnected. instead of asking for essences or entities, activities that can be 
realised come to the fore. Only then and from that position can we look at entities 
such as actors or subjects (Abbott, 2007, p. 9). This perspective also turns away 
from predominantly intentional and cognitive understandings of agency. Hence, 
agents are not substantialised agents, but often consist of imbricated and overlap-
ping entities or fabrics, which are complex and in motion. Consequently, agency 
can be seen as a realised, situated, permuted capacity that can be accomplished 
through the combination of various, interconnected “persons” and “things”.
What is the added value of this extended, qualitative different understanding 
of agency? A relational/relativistic perspective on agency suggests that, first, as 
researchers we do not (any longer) need to substantialise and localise agency exclu-
sively in one individual. This is something that we human beings already accomplish 
well enough in our everyday practices due to our anthropocentric bias (Barnes, 
2001, p. 349). Obviously, as human beings, we are inclined to take the relational 
characteristics of “things” within a specific context for the internal powers or the 
essential nature of these things in the first place (p. 349). in any case, a mere repeti-
tion of this perspective does not provide new scientific knowledge. Rather, it masks 
an adequate approach to agency. Second, thinking of agency merely within a dualis-
tic perspective of agency/structure is not a viable option; however, the two concepts 
might be mediated. Agency is not an individual capacity that has to be asserted or 
analysed. To sum up, strengthening a relational/relativistic approach in Childhood 
Studies means staying clear of any reification of “agency”, “social structures” or 
“individuals”, as well as “networks” or “connections”.
Conclusion
i started with an eclectic review of recent contributions towards agency in 
 childhood, taking them as examples for current endeavours towards a more 
nuanced, differentiated understanding of agency as against tendencies that have 
been criticised in “early” Childhood Studies. For reasons of contrast, i differen-
tiated between recent contributions that, on the one hand, more or less try to 
redesign or advance approaches to agency. My critique, which is open to question, 
was that they are nevertheless somehow still saturated with a binary thinking of 
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agency/structure. At least, they do not address deeply the question of how agency 
is brought about socially/collectively and how it comes to be attached to certain 
entities, e.g. “children” or “adults”, or taken away from them. Yet, on the other 
hand, i also took note of contributions that deploy approaches that are anchored 
in what i called relational/relativistic thinking. To unfold and underpin these 
accounts, i drew on contributions in social and cultural anthropology that allow 
for a dehumanised, denaturalised, de-individualised understanding of agency. To 
put it positively, they allow agency to be conceived as a complex, situational 
and collective achievement that is partly stabilised through other “humans” and 
“objects”, or mediated by them. This extended understanding of agency is far 
from being an updated version of the conventional understanding of agency. 
The road i outlined here is not intended to support an improved or “fixed” 
approach towards individual or human agency, or of its shapes and functions. 
A fully social or collective understanding of agency that includes “objects” leads 
to something different. it enhances our sensitivity towards what is regarded as 
important and should be examined. Second, it offers a different methodological 
way of how to address phenomena of “agency” in childhood studies. Hence, tak-
ing the “Relation Road” is not a lazy way to level out, avoid or sideline questions 
of power or representation. Quite the contrary: it is a way to frustrate convenient 
attempts that place all these parameters in people’s heads or outsource them to 
some factors and forces “in the background” or “in context”. i think that this 
sensitivity and methodology also allows for a more adequate approach towards 
the dynamics, quick ruptures and changes in the everyday lives of children and 
their “others”, as well as towards the fixed, durable and persistent elements across 
the different situations and spaces experienced by children, as for example in new 
programmes and practices in early childhood education and care. The argument 
is that we can employ relational/relativistic thinking as a heuristic method in the 
study of childhood or children. Theoretically and empirically, research has to start 
from the dynamic processes through and in which relations are brought about in 
time and space, and which from time to time result in the empirical production 
on the level of everyday life that allocates “agency”, as a differentiated capacity, 
to human beings, e.g. as an individual capacity to children or adults. Seen in this 
way, “agency” can serve as a useful concept for orienting research in Childhood 
Studies. if we use the wider discussion on agency within this relational/relativ-
istic perspective, then agency completely loses the essentialist, individualist and 
naturalist aura that still emanates from conventional approaches toward agency in 
the new Childhood Studies. Somehow, the seed must die in order to bear fruit.
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